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Abstract 
This paper reviews the current state of behavioural economics and its applications to 
energy efficiency in developing countries. Taking energy efficient lighting in Ghana, 
Uganda and Rwanda as empirical examples, this paper develops hypotheses on how 
behavioural factors can improve energy efficiency policies directed towards poor 
populations. The key argument is that different types of affordability exist that are 
influenced by behavioural factors to varying degrees. Using a qualitative approach, this 
paper finds that social preferences, framing and innovative financing solutions that 
acknowledge people’s mental accounts can provide useful starting points. Behavioural 
levers are only likely to work in a policy package that addresses wider technical, market 
and institutional barriers to energy efficiency. More research, carefully designed pre-tests 
and stakeholder debates are required before introducing policies based on behavioural 
insights. This is imperative to avoid the dangers of nudging.  
Keywords: energy efficiency, behaviour, lighting, Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda 
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1 Introduction 
Energy efficiency is central to energy security, the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
and technological catching-up of developing countries. In addition, it can contribute to 
poverty reduction by helping poor households to save money. Despite decades of efforts 
to increase the energy efficiency of economies and to diffuse energy efficient technologies 
worldwide, results are still poor – especially in developing countries. While much has 
been written about the possible over- or underestimation of the size of this so called 
energy efficiency gap and the factors responsible for its existence (Gillingham / Palmer 
2013; Allcott / Greenstone 2012; Anderson / Newell 2004; Jaffe / Stavins 1994), there is 
still no satisfactory answer to the question of how to close it. Market failures, a lack of 
information and awareness, and badly targeted incentives and tariffs are among the most 
common barriers to energy efficiency (IEA 2010; Gillingham et al. 2009). 
Recent research on energy consumption in industrialized countries has shown that 
behavioural factors – such as people’s tendency to hold on to technologies they already 
own even though they are costly, to procrastinate or to react to losses more strongly than 
to gains – may provide explanations for the failure of respective policy and market 
incentives (Gillingham / Palmer 2013; RAND 2012; Pollitt / Shaorshadze 2011). It is still 
unclear, however, to what extent these factors apply to developing countries. What does 
behavioural economics have to offer developing countries with regard to energy efficiency 
diffusion? To what extent can policies that take behavioural insights into account better 
balance the political goals of affordability, energy access and clean energy? In discussing 
these questions, this paper reviews the behavioural economics literature from the 
perspective of energy efficiency in developing countries and establishes some analytical 
tools and hypotheses for future research that take into account insights from development 
research. Finally, it aims to show how energy efficiency policy can be made more pro-
poor by using the empirical examples of energy efficient lighting in Ghana, Uganda and 
Rwanda. My key argument is that different types of affordability exist among the poor and 
are influenced by behavioural factors to varying degrees. The connection of behavioural 
economics, energy efficiency and poverty reduction contributes to closing this research 
gap. This paper therefore advances theoretical debates in development research, 
behavioural science and environmental policy; develops an innovative research agenda; 
and provides the practical debate with a new direction.  
Behavioural economics has become such a vast field that it is impossible to provide a 
comprehensive overview of all its developments. I thus only review those core concepts of 
behavioural economics that are relevant to energy efficiency, particularly in developing 
countries (section 2). Studies on microinsurance and health behaviour provide valuable 
insights here. After briefly presenting the main barriers to energy efficiency diffusion in 
developing countries, section 3 assesses the potential and pitfalls of these principles for 
energy policy design by discussing which behavioural factors may be helpful and which 
harmful to the poor. An empirical analysis of energy efficient lighting in Ghana, Uganda 
and Rwanda will be conducted in section 4, thereby refining the assumptions of the previous 
sections and developing concrete hypotheses for future testing. Methodologically, this paper 
approximates an abductive qualitative approach that draws on available literature, reports 
and newspaper articles. The three countries selected have all run large-scale lighting 
programmes in recent years with different approaches and varying degrees of success, while 
being under significant pressure to increase energy access, secure energy supply and keep 
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energy policy pro-poor. This makes them particularly suitable for comparison. Finally, this 
paper provides an outlook for both research and practice in section 5.  
2 Behavioural factors in decision-making 
2.1 Utility maximizing decisions and their alternatives 
Have you kept your old, rattling fridge for years even though you know there are more 
efficient ones? Have you ever put off an investment decision because there was simply too 
much to choose from? Behavioural economics offers some answers to why people hang on 
to things they already own, procrastinate, change their minds, help others and do not 
always behave rationally. 
Neoclassical economists assume that individuals take rational, utility maximizing 
decisions after accessing and considering all relevant information, which often includes a 
cost–benefit analysis. In this traditional scenario, preferences and tastes are fixed and 
altruistic motives or fairness does not exist. Preferences and discounting rates remain the 
same over time unless the pay-off changes. An individual thus prefers to consume a good 
or resource now rather than at a later point in time, irrespective of the way the information 
about the good is framed.  
A wide range of studies from behavioural economics as well as psychology (e.g. Goldstein 
et al. 2008; Yates 1983), sociology (e.g. Dahrendorf 1959; Stern / Dietz 1994) and 
political science (e.g. Lau / Redlawsk 2001) have shown that extra-logical factors impact 
on individual and public decision-making, thus challenging the traditional economic view 
on various grounds. Since Simon’s early work on bounded rationality (1956) and Allais’ 
(1953) and Ellsberg’s (1961) critiques of the standard probability model, behavioural 
economics has developed four major strands of economic research: (1) prospect theory 
and loss aversion; (2) inconsistent time preferences and hyperbolic discounting; (3) 
information, mental accounting and framing; and (4) social preferences and social aspects. 
The concepts and results of these strands often overlap.  
The first strand of research on prospect theory was developed as an alternative to expected 
utility theory. Prospect theory argues that people take decisions based on different 
valuations of losses and gains, relating them to a reference point (Tversky / Kahnemann 
1992; Kahnemann / Tversky 1979). The status quo or the aspiration level most often serves 
as such a reference point. In contrast, expected utility theory sees an individual as being 
indifferent to reference points because only absolute wealth matters, not relative assets 
compared to a specific point in time. Prospect theory further assumes that in a situation of 
risk and uncertainty,
1
 an individual is more risk-averse if the decision involves a potential 
gain (concave value function) and behaves in a risk-seeking way if a loss is likely (convex 
value function). This loss aversion implies that losses loom larger in people’s minds than 
gains (Tversky / Kahnemann 1992). For political actors who take this into account, the 
framing of information crucial to the decision-making process becomes relevant (see 
                                                          
1 Risk in economics means that probabilities about a future event occur with a measurable probability; 
under uncertainty, either probabilities cannot be calculated or it is unclear whether a future event will 
occur at all. 
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below). In contrast to the expected utility model, probability is non-linear in prospect theory: 
individuals assign too much weight to small probabilities and underestimate medium and 
high probabilities. This tendency is related to hyperbolic discounting (see below). 
Loss aversion may to some extent explain the endowment effect (Thaler 1980), the status 
quo bias (Samuelson / Zeckhauser 1988) and the difference between the amount that an 
individual is willing to pay (WTP) for a good or service and willing to accept (WTA) to 
abandon a good or tolerate something negative (e.g. pollution) (Knetsch / Sinden 1984). 
According to the classic Coase theorem, the gap between WTA and WTP should be very 
small, but many empirical tests have falsified this claim. Standard economic theory can 
explain these deviations to some extent as well (Mansfield 1999), but people’s tendency to 
overvalue things they already own (endowment effect) or unwillingness to change the 
current situation (status quo bias) are more psychologically grounded explanations. Since 
these two behavioural factors may in turn be influenced by loss aversion and multiple 
reference points (Ericson / Fuster 2013), maintaining analytical clarity in empirical field 
experiments is challenging. At this point there is insufficient empirical evidence to clarify 
the mutual influence of these factors on real-life political and economic decisions and to 
show which factor matters most for different kinds of decisions. 
The second strand of research looks at time inconsistencies and hyperbolic discounting. In 
a nutshell, time inconsistent decision-making means that a person takes a different 
decision in the same situation at a later point in time. Hyperbolic discounting presents one 
possible way of explaining and modelling these inconsistencies. While standard decision-
making theory assumes that discount rates and preferences are independent of the decision 
date, a change of preferences over time is possible in hyperbolic discounting models. A 
substantial body of research has found that subjects tend to choose earlier, smaller rewards 
over later, larger rewards when the earlier reward offers immediate consumption; this 
preference is reversed when both rewards are delayed (Pesendorfer 2006). For instance, if 
offered the choice between a free meal voucher valid for today and two free meal 
vouchers valid for tomorrow, people will most likely choose the one for today. But if 
given the choice between a voucher for a meal in 100 days and a voucher for two meals in 
101 days, people will most likely choose the second option. Laibson (1997) call this the 
‘immediacy effect’. It is connected to an individual’s tendency to not care enough about 
his or her own future self and results in procrastination or difficulties in committing to 
long-term investments, such as retirement schemes or climate change management 
(Gowdy 2008). Self-control mechanisms that target temptation such as automatic reminder 
messages may counter this effect (Tsvetanov / Segerson 2013). A topic of hot debate 
among environmental economists is the extent to which hyperbolic discounting functions 
provide sufficient deviations from standard discounted utility models to understand the 
‘black box’ of environmental decision-making (Gowdy et al. 2013; Rubinstein 2003). 
Thus, the current challenge for research on long-term environmental problems and energy 
system change no longer lies in the fine-tuning of econometric modelling, but rather in 
analysing actual messy decision-making situations – both in the public and private realms. 
In a third strand of research, the analysis of how people deal with different kinds and amounts 
of information has attracted many behavioural economists. The framing and priming of 
information in certain ways represent key concepts in this literature (Li / Chapman 2013; 
Gallagher / Updegraff 2012; Bertrand et al. 2010). Framing can be used by policymakers, 
donors or companies to shape and implement their programmes as well as by stakeholders to 
Babette Never 
4 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
influence policy. The framing of contents in this regard overlaps with discourse analysts’ 
interest in the production and dominance of certain storylines and narratives. On the one hand, 
too much information may prevent an individual from taking a decision (choice overload), as 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found. On the other hand, feedback on the way peers have decided 
or behave can spur the decision-making process (Allcott 2011a). 
Three tools that people use to handle information are of particular interest: (1) mental accounts 
for different types of investment, which prestructure spending behaviour (Thaler 1999); (2) 
heuristic shortcuts to process information which may sometimes be more effective and at 
other times lead to mistakes; and (3) a tendency to react more to salient, clear and up-to-date 
information and to focus on the short-term costs and effects of one’s actions (Wilson / 
Dowlatabadi 2007). By way of example, this could be a prominently placed, clear and recently 
awarded certificate regarding the non-toxic contents on the birthday present for your child – 
for example, the German Stiftung Warentest label. These different heuristics have generated a 
lot of controversy in psychology (Gigerenzer / Gaissmaier 2011) and also present a challenge 
to empirical work on energy efficiency behaviour (see section 2.2). 
A fourth strand of behavioural economics that is also relevant to energy efficiency targets 
social preferences. In rational choice thinking, interpersonal considerations such as 
fairness, altruistic motives and trust do not impact decision-making. In the past decade 
behavioural economists have conducted a series of canonical experiments (e.g. the 
ultimatum game, dictator game, trust game and public goods game) that have identified 
instances in which individuals do care about these factors (e.g. Fehr / Gächter 2000; 
Chater / Vlaev 2008; for an overview, see Wilson 2011 and Cardenas / Carpenter 2008). 
The so-called warm glow effect, for example, describes the positive feelings people 
experience when contributing to the public good or helping others (Andreoni 1989). These 
results overlap with some of political science’s and sociology’s work on norms (e.g. 
Wiener 2009) and social psychology’s insights into the influence and perception of others, 
norms and attitudes (e.g. Stern 1999; Stern / Dietz 1994). 
In all four strands of behavioural economics, expanding the methodological toolbox is 
required. The vast majority of behavioural economics research uses game-theoretic set-ups 
and lab and field experiments. However, not all those behavioural economics variables 
tested are useful for real economic situations or can be empirically measured outside of 
experimental settings, as Pesendorfer (2006) correctly argues. 
2.2 Key concepts of behavioural economics in energy efficiency 
Many of the above-discussed behavioural factors may be relevant for energy efficiency, but 
only a few have been empirically tested in this particular field. Furthermore, applications of 
behavioural economics to energy efficiency have thus far only focused on industrialized 
countries. Empirical work has been conducted on feedback and framing, hyperbolic 
discounting and decision-making shortcuts, self-control problems and temptation. Loss 
aversion, the endowment effect, inconsistent time preferences and salience are also likely to 
be relevant to investments in energy efficient technologies or appliances as well as to 
policymakers’ decisions (Pollitt / Shaorshadze 2011; Wilson / Dowlatabadi 2007). These 
factors have not yet been systematically analysed in empirical settings. 
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Feedback mechanisms have been well explored in many case studies on energy 
consumption behaviour, for example in the United States (Allcott 2011a; Costa / Kahn 
2010; Ayres et al. 2009), the United Kingdom (Dolan / Metcalfe 2010) and the Netherlands 
(Abrahamse et al. 2007). Feedback on electricity use can reduce household consumption, 
albeit by a rather small percentage (0.3–6.3 per cent) of the electricity bill (Allcott 2011a). A 
scaling-up of these effects is required to make a meaningful difference, possibly in 
combination with other instruments. In the Netherlands the combination of feedback with 
tailored information – avoiding choice and information overload – and goal setting has 
proven useful as households react differently to different incentives (Abrahamse et al. 2007). 
Feedback is possible before and during energy consumption (e.g. through in-house meters) 
or after consumption (e.g. through electricity bills or extra information comparing 
individual households to neighbourhood consumption). Based on a comparison of 26 
energy projects in 10 different industrialized countries, Fischer (2008) argues that 
appliance-specific feedback provided over a long time span and presented clearly is most 
effective, particularly if interactive and computerized tools are used. Here, framing and 
feedback go hand in hand. It is, however, an open question as to whether this can be 
transferred to developing countries where households typically use a prepaid token system 
for electricity, where most households do not own a computer and where it would prove 
difficult to instal monitoring systems. In Northern Ireland low-income households using 
prepayment meters were found to consume more electricity than bill paying consumers, 
recharging smaller amounts more often (Brutscher 2011); whether this applies to other 
countries as well is unclear. Brutscher (2011) claims that people’s different mental 
accounts for larger and smaller purchases are responsible, though he only indirectly tests 
this by looking at electricity expenditure and electricity consumption panel data. 
Concerning hyperbolic discounting and decision-making shortcuts, some studies have 
shown that car buyers incorrectly estimate fuel usage over time (Allcott 2011b; Turrentine / 
Kurani 2007). But empirical evidence for these factors is still not sufficient at this point. It is 
difficult to empirically determine whether individuals’ beliefs are systematically biased 
because multiple behavioural and non-behavioural factors may influence a decision-making 
process at the same time. Moreover, lab conditions and real-life decision-making may also 
differ – this is a general challenge for lab-based experimental economics. 
Tsvetanov and Segerson (2013) find that self-control problems and temptation are 
responsible for households’ choices of refrigerators – both with and without energy 
efficiency labels. They use an alternative model to hyperbolic discounting based on Gulf 
and Pesendorfer’s (2001) framework to explain the energy efficiency gap. Here, a difference 
between richer and poorer households becomes relevant, as Tsvetanov and Segerson already 
indicate themselves. For poorer households or individuals, initial up-front costs of an energy 
efficient appliance or technology appear larger and may objectively exist in liquidity 
constraints. In such a context, not buying an energy efficient light bulb actually becomes 
rational. However, further research is required to distinguish and test mechanisms of 
temptation and discounting for different energy efficient technologies. 
The argument that loss aversion and the endowment effect can explain the energy efficiency 
gap has been made by several researchers (Gillingham / Palmer 2013; Pollitt / Shaorshadze 
2011; Greene 2011). However, clear empirical evidence is still lacking. Keeping inefficient 
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technologies or household appliances simply because they still work can come together with 
faulty calculations of future amortization of new investments. Here again, the perceived and 
actual liquidity constraints of enterprises and households may come into play. 
Generally, these behavioural insights could be used by governments and administrations to 
formulate policies and regulations, by donors and NGOs to shape their programmes and by 
companies to sell their products and services. In the area of political steering and policy 
design, several possibilities and challenges result from these initial findings. Based on 
libertarian paternalism, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) propose a purposeful framing of 
consumer choices by influencing the choice-setting process. The target groups of policies 
are nudged towards beneficial decisions that counter previous market, policy and 
behavioural failures. An example of a nudge towards energy efficiency is making an energy 
efficiency investment the default option (e.g. a utility company’s default installation of 
smart meters for new customers). Allcott, Mullainathan and Taubinsky (2013) argue that 
shaping behavioural interventions this way may help to close the energy efficiency gap. 
They integrate nudge-inducing mechanisms in their modelling of the externalities and 
internalities of energy taxes. The optimal policy formulas show that tax or subsidy levels 
and welfare gains are determined by the average marginal internality of the instrument, 
instead of just the average internality. For instance, environmentally conscious consumers 
buy more efficient products and are thus more likely to react more strongly to subsidized 
efficient light bulbs. They may, however, be a marginal group among all consumers; thus it 
matters who is saving energy, not only how much is being saved, when designing taxes and 
subsidies adequately (Allcott et al. 2013, 34). This calls for a thorough analysis of 
consumers and their behaviour before political actors start developing policy. Here, the 
representation of interests of different voter and interest groups among policymakers also 
has to be considered. Competing political actors often shape technocratic or expert 
recommendations to their political goals before implementation. 
Target groups’ different reactions can be a challenge for nudging programmes, as Costa 
and Kahn (2010) found. In the United States liberals are more apt to react to feedback 
information on their electricity bill than conservatives (Costa / Kahn 2010). Political 
affiliation is not the only characteristic that may impact on the uptake of energy efficiency: 
general attitudes to energy and the environment, income group, education level, gender, 
age and socio-economic background also matter. Though relevant research is still in its 
early stages. Sustaining behavioural change presents an additional challenge for policies 
and instruments that aim to nudge. Those research projects that conducted a follow-up 
study showed that behavioural changes were often not sustained and non-monetary 
incentives proved rather ineffective over time if they were not tied to the pricing of 
electricity or energy (Pollitt / Shaorshadze 2011). 
Generally, it is important to distinguish between the energy conservation behaviour or 
habits of individual consumers and investment decisions in energy efficient technology as 
different behavioural factors and different context conditions may apply in both areas. The 
extent to which the poor behave differently and whether a change in energy efficiency 
behaviour through nudging is possible under income and energy access constraints will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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2.3 Do the poor behave differently? 
From the perspective of the poor, liquidity constraints and having to satisfy the most 
pressing short-term needs may seem like the most decisive factor in whether to invest in 
energy efficient appliances (e.g. an energy efficient light bulb). Many economists assume 
that the poor are more risk-averse, more impatient in their decision-making and less likely 
to plan for the future. Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir, however, argue that the poor 
experience the same weaknesses and biases as all other people, but that these may be more 
sharply pronounced and have potentially more detrimental consequences (Bertrand et al. 
2004: 419). The feeling of scarcity, or rather poverty itself, acts like a constraint in poor 
people’s minds, automatically capturing most of an individual’s cognitive capacity 
(Mullainathan / Shafir 2013). The resulting focus on immediate needs causes the neglect 
of other issues (Mullainathan / Shafir 2013), which possibly explains why energy 
efficiency occupies a rather small place in people’s mental accounts. Mullainathan and 
Shafir’s scarcity argument still needs to be empirically validated though. 
Empirical studies that test the interplay between behavioural economics principles and other 
possible influences on energy efficiency diffusion in developing countries are scarce. Apart 
from behavioural factors, it is useful to differentiate between financial, informational and 
organizational barriers to energy efficiency investments in developing countries (Kostka et 
al. 2013). For Chinese small and medium enterprises, informational barriers, family 
ownership and internal decision-making structures, governmental regulations and support, 
and a lack of skilled labour have been identified as major barriers to more energy efficiency 
(Kostka et al. 2013). In St. Lucia knowledge and attitudinal factors seem to be at least as 
strong as demographic factors (including income) regarding the purchase of energy efficient 
light bulbs (Reynolds et al. 2012). Decisions taken are thus multifaceted, implying that it 
might be useful to combine behavioural levers with measures targeting other barriers 
specific to the respective country context in a policy package. 
Regarding research strand 1 on prospect theory (see section 2.1), several findings exist. Poor 
consumers’ willingness to pay for green products could be lower due to financial constraints 
– though evidence for this is mixed. Green consumerism is indeed influenced by multiple 
factors (e.g. environmental knowledge, behavioural intention, perception of consequence) in 
developing countries and emerging economies (Wang et al. 2013). The portion of 
participants in field experiments in Guatemala (van Kempen et al. 2009), Malaysia 
(Mohamed / Ibrahim 2007) and India (Goswami 2008) willing to pay for sustainable 
firewood and eco-labelled clothing varies, but is not negligible (up to 30 per cent of 
consumers, depending on price). Although the issue of preferences in experimental settings 
differing to actual preferences applies to developing countries – as it does to industrialized 
countries – the assumption that the poor will not buy green products is a hasty one. 
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that all poor households and individuals behave the same 
in terms of risk and loss aversion. There is first evidence that regional differences exist. 
For example, people with low incomes in western China are more risk- and ambiguity-
averse than people in eastern China, while being a migrant worker or a resident worker 
does not make any difference (Li et al. 2013). Thus, differences in income levels and 
associated levels of risk aversion cannot always explain poor people’s behaviour. 
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Using a combined model of expected utility, risk aversion and loss aversion, Clist et al. 
(2013) offer a complementary explanation for underinvestment and underinsurance. In a 
risky choice lottery in a Ugandan field lab, consumption utility, risk aversion and loss 
aversion all explain first-round choices to different degrees (id.). Second-round choices 
were then most strongly influenced by social factors such as information on how others 
chose – which confirmed existing research. Generally, risks that result through market or 
regulatory imperfections and limited access to credit are likely to be complemented by 
perceived risks (e.g. unfamiliarity with a more efficient new technology). This requires 
additional research. 
Empirical work on time inconsistencies in developing countries (research strand 2) is 
sparse. Ito and Kono (2010) found some evidence of loss aversion and hyperbolic 
discounting in the uptake of a health insurance scheme in India, albeit using a very small 
sample. In Uganda people’s willingness to pay for energy efficient cookstoves increased 
with the introduction of payment by instalments, which helped overcome liquidity 
constraints and the immediacy effect (Beltramo et al. 2013). Addressing time 
inconsistencies was more relevant in this case than the framing of messages, for which no 
consistent effect was found. There is still a lack of systematic data and empirical testing 
on the relationship between development and hyperbolic discounting (Cardenas / 
Carpenter 2008). Generally, there seems to be little difference in risk and time preferences 
between developed and developing countries. Cardenas and Carpenter note that many 
people in developing countries are ignorant about the basic laws of probability (Cardenas / 
Carpenter 2008: 329). But Kahnemann and Tversky (1979, 1992) reported similar findings 
for some people in industrialized countries. Here again, more work is required to find out 
exactly when, how and why the poor behave differently in complex decision-making 
situations. 
Concerning self-control problems, small monetary or monetary-equivalent incentives may 
help to solve procrastination in the uptake of health services and changing health-related 
behaviour (Banerjee et al. 2010; Thornton 2008). There is also some evidence that the 
salience effect exists in different developing countries as well (research strand 3). Text 
messages with salient information and reminders helped to overcome procrastination in a 
series of randomized field experiments on savings behaviour in Bolivia, Peru and the 
Philippines (Karlan et al. 2010). However, a study on fertilizer purchase in Kenya could 
not establish a clear causal link between investment decisions and current information or 
marketing – other factors such as availability of funds at a certain time may be just as 
important and mutually reinforcing (Duflo et al. 2009). Again, it becomes clear that 
decision-making outside experimental settings is likely to be under multiple influences 
that sometimes coincide with behavioural economics and sometimes do not. 
Research strand 4 on social preferences and social issues has been most widely assessed in 
developing countries, though not with an energy efficiency focus. A number of studies 
have tested social preferences – including trust, fairness (ultimatum game), altruism 
(dictator game) and cooperation – in field labs in different developing countries (for an 
overview see Cardenas / Carpenter 2008). The majority of studies indicate that variations 
in trust and reciprocity – associated with social capital – are correlated with the GDP 
growth rate, the percentage of the population in poverty, the unemployment rate and 
inequality within the country (Cardenas / Carpenter 2008). There is virtually no evidence 
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to suggest that the poor are more risk-averse than the rich, while findings on whether the 
poor are more impatient is mixed (id.). In real, complex situations of uncertainty it is quite 
likely that risk-averse behaviour coincides with loss aversion, ambiguity aversion or the 
willingness to cooperate with others. It is not clear whether poorer people are more loss-
averse. In a comparative field experiment in six Latin American cities, ambiguity-averse 
and loss-averse participants had significantly lower levels of well-being (Cardenas / 
Carpenter 2013). However, the authors themselves point out that alternative 
interpretations and difficulties in terms of direction of causality between the level of well-
being and preferences remain due to the set-up of their study. 
The uptake of microinsurance schemes by poor households, for example, depends to some 
extent on income levels but also on trust, familiarity with the product and the supplier, 
social networks and peer effects (Giesbert / Steiner 2011; Thornton et al. 2010; Giné et al. 
2008; Anderson / Stamoulis 2006). A lack of trust in the provider or vendor of a product – 
such as microinsurance or energy-related services – hampers its diffusion. Trust-building 
is essential for the proliferation of energy service companies that develop and implement 
energy saving measures for their customers (Kostka / Shin 2011). 
In common-pool resource experiments in Namibia and South Africa, historical 
developments and cultural norms and habits were found to influence cooperation 
behaviour (Prediger et al. 2011). Context- and country-specific approaches and testing are 
therefore useful. Distributional norms are likely to be local phenomena that also vary with 
local economic conditions (Cardenas / Carpenter 2008). Analyses of attitudes to energy 
and governmental service provision in this regard are important to understanding the 
respective background. 
While many research gaps still exist, the different studies discussed indicate that the 
behaviour of poor individuals and households in developing countries does not differ per 
se from that of people in industrialized countries. There are several challenges to research 
and practice in the field, and they concern the matter of (a) methods, (b) policy design and 
(c) the rebound effect in energy efficiency. 
With regard to methods, experimental economics faces three challenges in developing 
countries. First, both lab and field experiments still often rely on student participants, 
skewing the representativeness of results. Second, as in industrialized countries, possible 
disparities between stated and actual preferences exist. The perceived social 
appropriateness of answers is difficult to overcome. Third, in some societies (e.g. 
Vietnam) people may have difficulties with imagining hypothetical situations (Anderson / 
Stamoulis 2006), which results in experimental settings producing hardly any valid 
findings. Apart from these methodological issues, it is also possible that there are 
differences between perceived risks and real or perceived liquidity constraints that impact 
on both energy efficient investments and energy-related habits (see section 4). 
In terms of policy design, Datta and Mullainathan (2012) suggest that a diagnosis of the 
behavioural bottlenecks should be the start of a policy or intervention design process. 
Based on this analysis, the selection of one or more behavioural design principles for an 
intervention can occur – for example, by providing microincentives, reminders and 
tailored messages or reducing the need to self-control by paying out smaller amounts of 
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money more often. Although the authors then suggest a pilot phase and redesign of the 
intervention, they say very little about the actual implementation in specific local socio-
economic and political settings. In fact, the possible pitfalls of nudging and designing 
policies this way are not discussed at all. In their experiment, de Haan and Linde (2011) 
found that people who had been nudged towards not changing a good default option may 
actually perform worse in repeated choices with changed circumstances. Nudging could 
therefore affect the choice process itself. Moreover, determining the choice architecture 
for individuals is problematic from a democratic freedom point of view. After all, who 
determines what makes a ‘good choice’? Depending on the political decision, the actual 
process leading to the shaping of policies is often characterized by a number of players, 
interests, coalitions and networks that may mediate or reinforce these possible 
disadvantages. 
Within energy efficiency studies, a careful conceptualization of the rebound effect
2
 may 
be necessary for developing countries – particularly in areas with low levels of energy 
access. On the one hand, the rebound effect may be detrimental to energy efficiency if 
new and old technological appliances are run at the same time, thus actually increasing 
consumption. On the other hand, being able to increase consumption with more efficient 
devices could be positive for development – for instance, if more tokens for prepaid 
electricity were available to households. Research on the rebound effect in developing 
countries and its links with other aspects of development remains scarce (IRGC 2013; Roy 
2000). The positive and negative implications of the rebound effect mentioned here show 
that carefully differentiating between target groups and the balance of political goals is 
useful when evaluating energy efficiency policy outcomes. 
In sum, the state of behavioural economics and the debate on its application to energy 
efficiency and developing countries have made clear that a variety of factors (e.g. social 
preferences, salience and loss aversion) are likely to be relevant to the poor’s energy-
related decision-making. Behavioural factors may thus provide additional explanations of 
why the diffusion of energy efficiency in developing countries remains slow. There is no 
evidence that poor people behave differently to other demographics per se, but their 
decisions can have harsher consequences. The lack of financial slack means that giving in 
to temptation (e.g. buying sweets instead of saving for the expensive fridge required) or 
making poor decisions when faced with uncertainty (e.g. farmers buying and using 
excessive amounts of fertilizer, which turns out to be harmful to the field) are more 
detrimental to poor households than richer households (Mullainathan / Shafir 2013; 
Banerjee / Duflo 2011). However, many of the behavioural factors proven to be barriers in 
developed economies – and which may be relevant for energy efficiency in developing 
countries – remain untested at this point. It is also unclear what happens if nudging meets 
diverse local socio-economic and political contexts. This requires a differentiation 
between the groups targeted by energy efficiency measures that carefully examines both 
the positive and negative consequences of the rebound effect. 
 
                                                          
2 The rebound effect describes the amount of energy saving that is taken back by a more frequent or 
longer use of the new technology or service. Direct, indirect and economy wide rebound effects are 
possible. The debate about how to measure and deal with these effects is ongoing (IRGC 2013). 
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3 Implications: Pro-poor energy efficiency policy 
3.1 Barriers to energy efficiency in developing countries 
The debate about how to best measure pro-poor growth while taking multidimensional 
poverty into account is ongoing (e.g. Grosse et al. 2008; Ravallion / Chen 2003; Kakwani 
/ Pernia 2000). The same applies to sustainability, which adds an environmental 
perspective. For pro-poor energy efficiency, both aspects are necessary. For the purposes 
of this paper, pro-poor policies imply absolute poverty reduction that benefits the poor 
more strongly than the rich – similar to pro-poor growth (Klasen 2008). I define pro-poor 
energy efficiency policies as those whose effects support poverty reduction without 
directly, indirectly or unintentionally harming the environment – neither in the short term 
nor the long term. 
Clean, efficient and affordable energy is generally said to have positive effects on income 
availability (e.g. less money spent on energy), health (e.g. less harm from smoke), 
education (e.g. more light for studying) and possibly new job creation (e.g. 
microbusinesses built on the sale of renewable energy products and services). Before 
focusing on energy efficiency and the poor in more detail, this section briefly outlines the 
barriers to energy efficiency in developing countries. These barriers make up a large part 
of the decision-making environment of the poor on energy issues. 
In this paper I focus on the moderately poor and the urban poor. I exclude the ultra poor 
because their preference is likely to be access to energy by any means given that they 
typically lack access to and thus consume very little energy. In their case, developmental 
concerns take precedence over energy efficiency or savings concerns – that is, they are 
focused on increasing energy consumption rather than limiting it. 
The diffusion and scaling-up of energy efficiency in developing countries is hampered by 
a variety of market, financial, technical, regulatory, institutional and informational barriers 
(IEA 2010; Sarkar / Singh 2010). Table 1 summarizes the most common obstacles, adding 
those behavioural categories that are most relevant for pro-poor energy efficiency attitudes 
and purchases. Examples of what these barriers imply for the poor are also provided. 
Without discussing each of these barriers in more depth, three important points should be 
noted. First, the particular combination of barriers in a given country may strongly impact 
on the behaviour of the poor and, in turn, the possibilities to change something using 
insights from behavioural economics. If minimum energy performance standards for 
efficient light bulbs are missing, the presence in the market of low-quality bulbs that break 
more easily and leak mercury will increase the poor’s possibly already existing distrust in 
the product and/or vendor. Second, behavioural insights may support energy efficiency 
policy both for the target group (here, the poor) and on the policymaking side. Utilizing 
behavioural insights could help to overcome institutional blockages in the policymaking 
process and/or a lack of information among policymakers. By way of example, this could 
be clear and simple messages about why energy efficiency is useful for a particular 
country, an electorate or the poor. The simultaneous presentation of possible solutions in a 
simplified way could diminish some of the fear associated with the different technicalities 
of the problem (framing/choice overload). Discussing solutions with short-term as well as 
long-term benefits could help to dissolve political resistance or a lack of interest (salience, 
technical and regulatory barriers). Third, not all of the above-listed behavioural factors 
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Table 1: Barriers to energy efficiency 
Barrier Example Relevance for the poor 
Market – Market organization and price  
distortions 
– Principal–agent problem whereby 
investor does not reap rewards of  
improved efficiency 
– Transaction costs (project  
development costs vs. energy savings) 
– Limited demand for EE goods and 
services 
High prices for electricity and EE 
equipment; restricted access to different 
energy alternatives 
Financial – Lack of understanding of EE  
investments 
– (Perceived) risk aversion 
– Limited financing/equity 
High upfront costs; energy costs represent 
a large proportion of overall income; 
perceived risk in investing in unfamiliar 
technologies 
Information/ 
awareness 
– Lack of sufficient information and 
consumer understanding (relates to 
behavioural barriers) 
– Lack of interest and deeper  
understanding by policymakers and 
administration 
Lack of understanding of the multiple 
benefits of efficient light bulbs, 
cookstoves and appliances (e.g. savings, 
health, demand side management effects), 
lack of knowledge how to save energy in 
daily life 
Regulatory/ 
institutional 
– Energy tariffs that discourage EE 
investment (e.g. declining block  
prices) 
– Import duties on EE equipment 
– Lack of appliance standards, labelling, 
building codes and testing as well as 
poor enforcement 
– Incentive structures that encourage 
energy providers to sell energy rather 
than invest in cost-effective energy  
efficiency 
– Institutional bias towards supply-side 
investments 
Confusing, highly priced products or 
products of low quality that discourage 
investment 
 
Possibly higher costs for grid-connected 
electricity because usually only access 
fees are subsidized 
Technical – Lack of affordable EE technologies 
that suit local conditions 
– Insufficient local capacities for  
identifying, developing, implementing 
and maintaining EE investments 
Lack of affordable EE technologies that 
meet the specific needs of the poor and 
support informal job creation (e.g.  
solar-powered mobile charging station) 
Lack of capacity to deal with EE 
equipment once it is broken 
Behavioural – Prospect theory, loss aversion and 
endowment effect 
– Inconsistent time preferences and 
hyperbolic discounting 
– Information (e.g. feedback, salience), 
framing and mental accounting (all  
related to choice architecture) 
– Social preferences and social aspects 
(e.g. social norms, trust, status, free 
riding) 
Irregular income that limits mental 
accounts to short time spans; lack of trust 
in utility providers/vendors of EE 
products 
To be further determined in the next  
sections 
Source: IEA 2010; Sarkar / Singh 2010; Author’s own additions: EE = Energy efficiency 
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will automatically support the demand for and use of energy efficient products among the 
poor, while also actually being pro-poor. Following a multidimensional understanding of 
poverty, energy is just one of several aspects that make up poverty status. Excessively 
high expenditures on energy efficient equipment with long payback periods could be 
harmful to other poverty dimensions. Influencing the choice architecture in this way may 
fuel distrust in political leadership and, in extreme cases, could be seen as a threat to 
participation and democracy by the poor. 
The sheer number and interrelatedness of barriers to energy efficiency may at first seem 
discouraging for achieving more pro-poor energy efficiency. The following sections will 
therefore discuss in more detail which behavioural insights can support the uptake of 
energy efficient technologies among the poor, how changing energy saving behaviour 
among the poor can be incentivized, and where such a change in behaviour does and does 
not make sense for poverty reduction reasons. 
3.2 Efficient technologies, investment decisions and energy saving behaviour of 
the poor  
The poor primarily consume energy through cooking, lighting, heating and economic 
purposes (e.g. running a microbusiness); radio, television and mobile phone usage may also 
play a role. The range of energy efficient technologies that they could use in carrying out 
these activities depends, first of all, on the energy sources used and whether access to the 
electricity grid is given or not. This section clarifies in which areas more energy efficiency is 
possible for the poor and which behavioural factors play a role. First hypotheses and 
suggestions for interventions will be developed. 
Generally, the poor in many countries use a mix of energy sources even if they have grid 
access (Shrestha et al. 2008; Masera et al. 2000). Higher electricity prices and fuel 
preferences for specific tasks (e.g. cooking) are often cited reasons (id.). According to the 
energy ladder hypothesis, a household’s choice of energy source or fuel depends mostly 
on income. With rising income, households move from traditional fuels (e.g. wood, 
biomass) to transitional fuels (e.g. kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas) to modern and 
cleaner fuels such as electricity from the grid or renewable energies (Leach 1992). A range 
of studies supports these basic findings (e.g. Lay et al. 2013; Heltberg 2004), but some 
also contradict them, showing that the availability of fuels and strategic decisions on 
current fuel prices also matter (Hiemstra-van der Horst / Hovorka 2008; Masera et al. 
2000). Unstable energy supply can make backup technologies necessary – for example, 
diesel generators in countries where electricity outages are frequent or biomass-fuelled 
ovens where the availability of liquefied petroleum gas cannot be guaranteed. 
The affordability of energy is certainly a key issue for the poor. Many studies set the threshold 
for affordable energy at 10 per cent of a household’s income (e.g. Fankhauser / Tepic 2007). 
To some extent, this is a normatively set number because energy and electricity prices vary 
greatly and affordability is a politicized concept (Winkler et al. 2011); nevertheless, it is a 
useful guideline. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) show that the poor do not always consciously aim 
at reducing their poverty by, say, investing in more food when more money is available to 
them. Instead, they tend to make choices that interrupt boredom and increase social status, 
such as purchasing televisions and using mobile phones. From an efficiency perspective, 
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investments that do not reduce poverty are acceptable as long as the equipment bought uses 
electricity efficiently (e.g. highest energy label category) and is not left running when not in 
use. Educating consumers to completely switch off equipment that is not being used is a very 
easy step that is independent of income or poverty status. Thus, income is not always the sole 
reason behind energy source and technology choices. 
For those poor households without access to the electricity grid, there are four way in 
which energy saving behaviour can be practised: (1) lighting, (2) switching to more 
efficient fuels and efficient cookstoves, (3) insulating or effectively ventilating homes and 
(4) using efficient appliances. 
First, more energy efficient lighting is possible in combination with an off-grid energy 
source (renewable energy plant or diesel generator). A compact fluorescent light (CFL) or 
light emitting diode (LED) can be used in solar lanterns or connected to solar home 
systems. LEDs are more efficient, especially with fluctuating voltages in developing 
countries, and contain no toxic mercury; they are, however, also more expensive. High 
quality CFLs can absorb up to 10 per cent fluctuation in voltages before their lifespan 
shortens. The mercury content of CFLs (0.5 mg in high quality ones, about 25 mg in low 
quality ones) presents a health challenge to many developing countries where adequate 
waste management and recycling facilities are non-existent. If poorer consumers knew 
about the health risks, the resulting mistrust, risk aversion and uncertainty about the 
technology and the utility/donor selling them may add to the barrier of higher upfront 
costs – especially if payment by instalment is not possible.  
The uptake of solar home systems and solar lanterns is influenced by several behavioural 
factors that do not correspond with standard economic theory. In spite of higher costs, 
East Timor communities prefer solar home systems to solar lanterns due to better light 
quality, less risk of damage to the photovoltaic module and longer duration of nightly 
operation (Bond et al. 2010). In India, in contrast, the uptake of solar lanterns has been 
slow because programmes focused solely on communicating subsidies rather than benefits 
and thus impeded early adopters and, in turn, their ‘spreading the word’ (Velayudhan 
2003). Changing modes of payment – for instance, by renting lamps – has been suggested 
as an additional solution (Chaurey / Kandpal 2009). Possible behavioural constraints that 
impact on the choices of the poor here are trust, uncertainty and risk aversion (i.e. not 
understanding the costs and benefits of the technology); framing; and mental accounting 
barriers (see section 4 in more detail). 
Second, switching to more efficient, cleaner fuels not only is beneficial for energy 
efficiency and climate change reasons but also significantly reduces indoor air pollution, 
particularly from cooking. The debate about fuel-switching and the uptake of modern 
cookstoves in developing countries has been going on for over 30 years now. It cannot be 
dealt with in more detail here. Fuel availability, fuel price and social/cultural factors all 
have an impact. A recent study found that cookstove trial periods, explanations of the 
cookstoves as part of a group event (social aspects) and payment by instalment (mental 
accounting) increased the willingness among Ugandan rural households to purchase 
cookstoves (Beltramo et al. 2013) – though only to a certain extent. A deeper analysis of 
the remaining challenges in this debate goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Third, insulating the poor’s homes against the cold to allow for better space heating counts 
as a ‘no regret’, low-cost option to improve energy efficiency (Spalding-Fecher et al. 
2002). In South Africa a successful governmental programme saw new ceilings installed 
in poor homes, leading to a decline in energy costs by 50 per cent during the four-month 
winter period (id). However, investing in energy efficient buildings only makes sense for 
those segments of the poor that plan to remain in their homes for the longer term. Since 
retrofitting a building is a one-off investment that may be a low priority for the poor, it 
seems rather unlikely that behavioural factors – apart from framing advertising to give 
feedback or using loss aversion for governmental or donor-run programmes – will have a 
continuous, long-term impact on the buildings sector. The likelihood that the poor will 
care about new building codes may also be rather small. 
Fourth, using efficient appliances in combination with renewable energy sources or 
diesel (e.g. to run a mobile phone charging stall) is also possible in an off-grid context. 
Energy efficient televisions and mobile phones are the appliances most likely to be used 
by the poor, followed by rice cookers and fans in Asian countries (Shrestha et al. 2008). 
These efficient appliances have to be available and clearly labelled as efficient before 
marketing campaigns that make use of clear and simple framing and feedback can be 
applied effectively. To build customer trust and reduce risk aversion, product quality has 
to be assured and affordable, and low-quality imitations must be prevented from entering 
the market. Payment schemes are also likely to be an issue, not only in connection with 
mental accounting but also with times when income is available. Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011) found that poor people with irregular income do not apply for credit from 
microfinance institutions, because this usually entails strict weekly repayments. Some 
poor people therefore choose informal lending schemes with high interest rates but more 
flexible repayment schedules. The regularity of income may therefore be an issue for 
poor households in terms of purchasing energy efficient appliances that require a loan or 
credit.  
Farmers using irrigation systems that run on diesel or grid electricity could invest in more 
efficient pump systems. This only makes sense if the farmer does not pay a sufficiently 
subsidized electricity flat rate (as is the case in northern India) or if power cuts occur 
regularly during peak load times. In these cases, careful calculations of payback periods 
and price effects (less frequent power outages due to lower peak load) are required. To 
actually contribute to poverty reduction, however, investment in energy efficient pumps at 
all costs should not be the goal. Here, when new and old equipment are used in parallel, 
the endowment effect may be a hindering factor. This could be overcome by taking old 
pumps in part exchange for new ones, with the vendor being reimbursed by the recycling 
industry or the government. 
Poor households with access to the grid have all of the above options. In addition, a 
wider range of energy efficient appliances (e.g. refrigerators) that require higher 
amounts of electricity may be used. Here, clear labelling that avoids an overload of 
information is important. In this respect, labelled-product advertisements incorporating 
feedback and social status could be useful. Many poor households may not be aware of 
their energy consumption. Feedback on electricity bills (either on the paper document 
itself or provided by the fee collector) and information on energy consumption levels of 
different kinds of household appliances could be a first step in addressing this. Feedback 
that employs neighbourhood consumption comparisons to nudge needs to be carefully 
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debated in the respective country beforehand. A survey of the poor may be appropriate 
to establish whether they are likely react negatively to feedback telling them to cut their 
energy use when they only have intermittent access to electricity in the first place. 
Increased energy consumption and rebounds can often have a positively effect on 
poverty reduction (e.g. through longer shop opening hours and increased studying time 
for children). Generally, feedback on bills only makes sense in areas where power cuts 
are not a regular occurrence. 
Token-based prepayment systems offer a way to better fit poor demographics’ energy use 
to their unstable income situations and mental accounts. Prepayment can increase energy 
consumption (which is favourable in the case of the poor) and at the same time give 
customers more control (Tewari / Shaah 2003). Prepayment meters are being introduced to 
an increasing number of countries not only as a pro-poor initiative but also as a measure to 
counter electricity theft. Relays simply cut off the electricity once the token has been used 
up. This means that distribution losses for utility providers decrease, which reduces costs 
and should – at least in theory – lead to lower electricity prices for consumers. However, 
utilities may not pass on their savings but reinvest in new generation capacities or grid 
extension. Generally, prepaid electricity as a type of pay-as-you-go system seems to work 
well. Information on meters and smart cards that are used in combination with tokens 
could utilize framing to influence consumption. This may pay off in combination with an 
offer of more efficient, reasonably priced products, such as CFLs. 
Token systems may have the disadvantage of restricting the access of the ultra poor, for 
whom illegal electricity connections are the only possibility. Many households may not be 
legally connected, but occupants may have instead illicitly connected to a main line or 
hired middlemen to do so. Dealing with electricity theft is a complex issue that needs 
economic, technical, social and institutional solutions (Katiyar 2005). Debating the role of 
behavioural factors would require an extensive amount of empirical data analysis for 
specific cases, which is not possible in this paper. 
To avoid undermining trust in energy efficient products in general, it would be advisable 
not to make use of default settings in developing countries for now. Nudging too hard, 
inadvertently nudging in the wrong direction (unintentionally non-pro-poor) or restricting 
choice too much may backfire in third wave democracies (like Ghana) and hybrid regimes 
(like Uganda and Rwanda), where the participation of the poor is a very sensitive topic. 
Saving energy makes sense for the moderately and urban poor only to the extent that 
devices are switched off when not in use and that grid-connected lights are not left on 
unnecessarily during power outages (lights are often left on to show when the power has 
come back on). 
This general discussion of on- and off-grid technologies and energy saving possibilities of 
the poor has made clear that behavioural factors already do play a role and could play a 
more relevant role in a variety of settings. Table 2 summarizes the possibilities for energy 
efficiency of the poor, potential relevant behavioural factors and possible interventions (to 
be tested in future research). The interplay between the existing technological, financial and 
institutional barriers and possibilities – both among the poor and among the policy and 
market environment – needs to be taken into account to understand the actual decision-
making context and how to change it. 
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Table 2: Starting points for pro-poor behavioural energy efficiency interventions 
 Behavioural constraints* Possible interventions* 
Lighting Risk aversion/uncertainty 
about product 
Provide salient, clear information; labelling/certification 
(with controls) 
Trust in vendor/product Build/use local sales networks, let people try out the 
product; organize local Q&A events; efficiency labels 
(with controls) 
Mental accounts  
(high upfront costs) 
Subsidies and pay-as-you go funding schemes;  
renting instead of buying 
Framing Salient, clear information on payback periods;  
possibly make use of loss aversion 
Fuel switch Social preferences/ 
norms 
Increase WTP by explaining cookstoves and solar 
systems at social events with neighbours; let people  
try out products (cultural/social norm change as long-
term goal) 
Mental accounts Subsidies and pay-as-you-go funding schemes; renting 
instead of buying 
Appliances Framing Salient, clear information on payback periods; possibly 
make use of loss aversion 
Endowment effect Take old products in part exchange for new products; 
maybe use loss aversion in advertising; send reminder 
text messages 
Hyperbolic discounting Salient, clear information on payback periods; let people 
with positive experiences explain to others; encourage 
group savings (combination with social pull) 
Trust in 
vendor/product/label 
Build/use local sales networks; let people try out the 
product; organize local Q&A events; efficiency labels 
(with controls) 
Technical 
equipment  
(e.g. pumps) 
Hyperbolic discounting Salient, clear information on payback periods; let people 
with positive experiences explain to others; encourage 
group savings (combination with social pull) 
Endowment effect Take old products in part exchange for new products or 
make turning in old compulsory for purchases on credit; 
maybe use loss aversion in advertising; send reminder 
text messages 
* More research required that tests causal links and impacts and adapts interventions to local context. 
Source:  own compilation 
From the preceding discussion, I have generated a first set of three hypotheses: 
H1: If poor households have a relatively regular income, paying for energy efficient 
equipment (e.g. CFLs, efficient cookstoves) becomes more likely with payment by 
instalment or pay-as-you-go systems because this better fits their mental accounts. 
H2: Attractive, simple to use combinations of energy efficient equipment increase the 
likelihood that poor people will accept, buy and use it. 
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An example could be subsidized solar home systems that offer mobile charging which 
could be used by households or microbusinesses. 
H3: If the trust in the utility provider, donor or vendor of electricity/energy efficient 
equipment is low and uncertainty about the product is high among the poor, introducing a 
social element will increase the likelihood of purchase.  
This could be achieved by having groups learn about the pros and cons of a product and 
then challenging them to explain it to their relatives the next day. If innovative financing 
solutions for energy efficient appliances are available, then combinations of trust-building, 
social factors and smart use of the endowment effect can overcome behavioural barriers 
on a larger scale. 
These general assumptions need further refinement according to specific elements of 
energy efficiency and the context of the cases under study to turn them into viable 
hypotheses. The following empirical section takes a first step towards this goal by 
developing more targeted hypotheses in the field of energy efficient lighting. 
4 Comparing energy efficient lighting in Ghana, Uganda and Rwanda 
4.1 Socio-economic and regulatory context 
Among the sub-Saharan countries, Ghana is one of the leaders in energy efficiency. 
Although Ghana has a higher general level of development and per capita income than 
Uganda and Rwanda, significant portions of all three of these countries’ populations 
belong to the urban and moderately poor. Moreover, all three ran large-scale CFL 
deployment programmes between 2007 and 2012. Uganda’s and Rwanda’s programmes 
were financed by the World Bank, whereas Ghana’s government financed its programme 
on its own. I will briefly outline to what extent these programmes were accompanied by 
legislation, regulations and pro-poor initiatives, before assessing the role of behavioural 
factors and the assumptions developed above. 
Rwanda plans to massively extend its grid and connect 70 per cent of its population by 
2017 (Government of Rwanda 2014). It also plans to invest USD 4.7 billion mainly in 
extending power from hydro, methane gas, geothermal and peat sources (Government of 
Rwanda 2014). This clear step towards more grid-based electricity could spur the market 
for CFLs and, prospectively, LEDs once these become cheaper through international 
market maturity or subsidies. It is easier to plug CFLs or LEDs into a working socket than 
to buy an additional device that produces electricity first. Currently, no specific 
legislation, labelling or regulations on minimum energy performance standards for 
efficient lighting exist. The Ministry of Infrastructure is working on legislation that will 
help to prevent low-quality CFLs entering the market (UNEP 2012: 26). Also, the 
National University of Rwanda is conducting an environmental impact assessment of CFL 
disposal. No recycling or waste management system is in place yet. In Rwanda, import 
taxes on energy efficient lighting products have been lowered and some products are 
exempt altogether. In terms of foreign direct investment, the Indian company Sahasra 
Electronics is building an LED manufacturing plant in Kigali, which is due to be 
completed in March 2014. The Rwandan Energy and Water Sanitation Authority is 
conducting feasibility studies to determine whether to subsidize LEDs to make them 
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affordable (Gasore 2013). The government supports the switch to LEDs given their higher 
efficiency levels and smaller mercury content.  
In Uganda there are no regulatory mechanisms, minimum energy performance standards 
or certification standards for efficient lighting products. There is no domestic production 
plant for CFLs or LEDs, but the government was required to waive import duties 
(previously 25 per cent) and VAT (previously 18 per cent) on efficient lighting products 
due to its participation in the World Bank CFL programme. The import of solar lanterns 
and combinations of solar home systems with CFL or LED is also tax-free. No recycling 
or waste management system has been established. The National Bureau of Standards has 
an electrical testing laboratory where the quality of light bulbs and other electrical 
appliances are assessed per Ugandan and international standards (UNEP 2012). 
Ghana has a comprehensive set of regulations and policies targeting efficient lighting. The 
government removed import duties and VAT on CFLs back in 2003. Moreover, minimum 
energy performance standards for self-ballasted fluorescent lamps have been in existence 
since 2005. To verify compliance, a facility at the Ghana Standards Authority was set up 
to run the necessary tests – entry to which is controlled by customs. Failure to comply 
with standards may incur in a fine of 250 penalty units or 12 months’ imprisonment 
(Ghana Energy Foundation 2005). Following a severe energy crisis in 2006, energy 
efficiency became a priority issue. In 2007 the Ghana Energy Commission distributed 6 
million CFLs free to consumers in exchange for inefficient incandescent lamps. This cost 
the government USD 15.5 million. The programme resulted in peak savings of 124 MW 
and CO2 savings of 112,320 tons per year. In 2009 CFL penetration had increased from 3 
per cent to 79 per cent and the number of incandescent lamps in the market had decreased 
from 58 per cent to 3 per cent (UNEP 2012, 58). 
The production, import and sale of incandescent lamps have been prohibited since 2008. 
Energy efficiency standards and labels have been in use for different household 
appliances, including light bulbs, since 2008/9. No strategy for recycling or management 
of CFL disposal exists, even though a study found that 64 per cent of those surveyed 
experienced at least one incident of broken CFLs, while 75 per cent of end users claimed 
to have no knowledge of mercury content in CFLs (UNEP 2012, 48). 
The price of electricity and therefore its affordability for the poor with grid access is 
similar in all three countries. In Rwanda the electricity tariff is presently set at a flat rate of 
RwF 134/kWh (USD 0.22/kWh) for residential and commercial consumers. The 
government’s objective is to cut the average electricity tariff to half of this (USD 
0.10/kWh). In Uganda domestic consumers also pay a fixed rate of UGX 524/kWh (USD 
0.21/kWh), while commercial consumers and medium and large industries have different 
tariffs according to peak and off-peak times. The Ugandan Electricity Regulatory 
Authority has steadily increased tariffs in the last decade to cope with increasing demand. 
In 2013 the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) in Ghana induced a tariff 
reform. The initially proposed increase of 65 per cent for the poor using up to 50 kWh and 
78 per cent for all other customer classes was rescinded in November 2013 after labour 
groups threatened to go on strike. The new tariff now only increases prices by about USD 
0.05/kWh (a 25 per cent increase) for the poorest using up to 50 kWh and USD 20/kWh 
for all other residential consumers. Ghana is therefore the only one of the three countries 
that offers a special tariff for the ultra poor. 
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4.2 Relevant behavioural factors 
In Rwanda the World Bank’s CFL deployment distribution project ran from 2007 to 2010. 
About 400,000 CFLs were given to existing customers of the utility company Electrogaz in 
exchange for incandescent bulbs. The first 50,000 were handed out for free in a pilot phase, 
and the rest were then sold for the price of an incandescent bulb (USD 0.37/lamp). A further 
400,000 bulbs were given for free to new Electrogaz customers as part of a welcome 
package, thus accompanying the government’s grid electrification programme. Incandescent 
bulbs were collected and destroyed and the destruction controlled by a third party. 
Additionally, the World Bank supported an intensive awareness-raising campaign. In 
Rwanda the CFL was advertised in multiple languages in a simple comic-style message (see 
example Annex). The message emphasized that the lamp uses five times less energy than 
standard bulbs, lasts eight times longer and helps the consumer to save a lot of money. 
While empirical data about the success of this particular message is not available, framing 
built on loss aversion could have been even more effective (e.g. ‘You could be wasting RwF 
10 every week by using the wrong light bulb’). The same applies to framing that is more 
salient, gives feedback on neighbours and is tailored to mental accounts (e.g. ‘This lamp 
saves you the money for 1 kg of cassava a month’, ‘While your neighbours will still be 
using the same new lamp they bought today during the next rainy season, you will have had 
to buy three of the old type by then’). 
The Rwandan solar lighting market is relatively small and largely supported by donors. 
About three-quarters (80 per cent) of the purchases made are solar lanterns (Disch / 
Bronckaers 2012). A GIZ renewable energy programme that started in 2013 aims to sell an 
additional 350,000 lanterns. Solar home systems that can charge several light bulbs, charge 
phones and provide electricity for a radio or television (depending on the size of the system) 
make up 11 per cent of the market, whereas micro–solar kits that can only charge a couple 
of light bulbs and a mobile phone have a market share of 8 per cent (Disch / Bronckaers 
2012). From the perspective of the companies involved in these markets, the affordability 
and price of the products, the management of distribution (including its financing) and 
import/transport were cited as the most relevant barriers in a survey conducted by the NGO 
Tubura (id.). Door-to-door sales through local networks and agents were found to be far 
more effective than vending in regional shops, but are also expensive to implement. 
Advertising and awareness-raising campaigns that used local radio question and answer 
sessions to immediately react to customer concerns were more successful than ordinary 
block advertising (id.) even though the print ads contained fairly clear messages (see 
Annex). 
From a behavioural point of view, several tentative conclusions are possible here. Trust in 
locally known vendors combined with a countermeasure to the status quo bias (e.g. going to 
people’s homes instead of having them come to the shop) increases the chances that poor 
households will purchase the product. Companies could switch to small-scale franchise-type 
product distribution, thus also supporting job creation for the poor. Social aspects through 
direct communication that can eliminate uncertainties and risk aversion are also relevant. In 
line with the general hypothesis developed in the previous section, products that combine 
multiple purposes for the poor meet their preferences more closely and have a higher chance 
of being bought. It would be interesting to test whether vendors supplied any explanation 
about actual payback periods in terms of energy savings compared to the usual energy 
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sources – thus countering potential hyperbolic discounting – and whether this made any 
difference. 
Bottom-up lighting initiatives are very small-scale but bring about direct poverty reduction 
effects and sometimes already implicitly make use of behavioural insights. An example of 
this is the Solar Sisters initiative (active in Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic 
Congo), which (a) trains local women in the use and sale of simple solar lights that replace 
kerosene lamps, (b) provides them with a number of lights and (c) lets them sell these lights 
in their local communities, which thus establishes a network. These saleswomen collect a 
commission on each sale.
3
 Since 2010 about 500 female entrepreneurs have sold over 
80,000 solar lights. This may seem like a moderate achievement, but given the difficulties of 
the solar market to emerge at all in these countries, it represents quite a success. Here, the 
knowledge of the local social norms, trust and a simple business model pays off for the 
saleswoman and the consumer. Moreover, in Uganda there are an increasing number of 
microbusinesses offering mobile phone charging with a small solar panel – a service that is 
quite profitable for the entrepreneur (Collings 2011). Some microentrepreneurs also use 
their charging stalls to sell or rent solar lanterns and sell mobile credit – explicitly choosing 
frequented social settings. The effects on poverty reduction, pro-poor job creation and 
energy efficiency of these local bottom–up initiatives and informal microbusinesses are of 
course small in the overall picture of pro-poor growth. Nevertheless, they could pave the 
way for more successful large-scale programmes and market development – increasing 
social acceptance and awareness as well as explaining technologies and savings rates – 
while contributing to long-term market creation by preparing consumers. 
The Ugandan CFL bulk procurement scheme saw 800,000 CFLs distributed, of which 
600,000 were distributed for free by the utility company UMEME Yellow Pages. Another 
50,000 bulbs were retained as free-of-charge replacements during the warranty period, and 
the remaining bulbs were sold at a low bulk price after the warranty period elapsed in order 
to support the development of a market with high quality CFLs. Before the World Bank 
programme, about 150,000 CFLs and 1.5 million incandescent bulbs were sold annually in 
Uganda. A survey among Kampala electricity customers was conducted beforehand, which 
showed that households were using three light bulbs on average – usually bought in 
supermarkets or at lamp dealer stalls. Awareness levels of energy savings through CFLs was 
very low among low-income residential users (i.e. the urban poor). The prime reason given 
for not buying CFLs was price. There are no current figures available that reveal whether 
customers who were given free CFLs also bought them again after the end of the bulb’s 
lifespan and thus further supported the market. Of the 10 per cent of customers who reported 
a broken bulb after one month, 52 per cent replaced it with an incandescent bulb. Moreover, 
17 per cent of eligible customers did not want a CFL bulb at all (World Bank 2009). This 
indicates that some underlying problems exist. In its programme evaluation, the World Bank 
admitted that its awareness-raising programme was limited to wealthier populations in 
Kampala through English-language materials and radio messages. Further problems 
encountered include the development of a CFL black market where free government bulbs 
were sold and the discrepancy between the number of CFLs distributed and the number of 
incandescent bulbs collected. Some customers were also distrusting of the yellow uniforms 
                                                          
3 http://www.solarsister.org/ and https://unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/7072.php 
(accessed January 7, 2014). 
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of the UMEME staff: they mistook them for members of the NRM party and suspected they 
were part of a political campaign (World Bank 2009). Behavioural factors that are very 
likely to have played a role in this programme are trust (in the product and vendor/provider), 
framing and the status quo bias, which is positively overcome by going to people’s homes 
instead of the poor having to make the extra effort. 
The Ugandan solar energy market has been slow to take off, even though it could provide 
off-grid lighting alternatives for the poor. Taking neighbouring Kenya and their sizeable 
solar home systems market as a role model has not worked out for Uganda thus far. 
According to the owner of Barefoot Power, one of the major solar lighting companies in 
Uganda, only 5 per cent of the population have access to solar energy. While a variety of 
donor and public–private initiatives at grassroots level exists, large-scale diffusion has not 
happened yet. Opinions about the reasons behind this differ: affordability and excessively 
high upfront costs, expectations of grid access in the near future, theft of systems resulting 
in reluctance to buy and unfamiliarity with the new technology (Kulabako 2013; World 
Bank 2009). In some cases, this lack of familiarity has been aggravated by the relabelling of 
products so that they show higher capacities than they can actually produce. Obvious 
product ‘failure’ then is likely to increase potential distrust and risk aversion on the part of 
buyers among the poor. 
Ghana already has a history of demand side management and a combination of awareness-
raising and energy-saving campaigns. In the early 1990s Ghana had already started a 
demand side management programme, which was largely rejected for political reasons. The 
public perceived the initiative as an attempt to shift the blame for supply problems to the 
consumer because the Ministry of Energy was the sole body charged with all energy 
questions. Additionally, the main electricity provider sells electricity through middlemen 
who have no interest in decreasing demand, as their own revenues would decrease. This 
situation gave rise to the politically neutral Energy Foundation in 1995. A survey conducted 
in 2000 revealed that 80 per cent of respondents who had heard the Energy Foundation’s 
energy efficiency messages and jingles began to switch appliances off when not in use. The 
combination of this campaign with an increase in electricity tariffs and the introduction of 
more efficient appliances and light bulbs led to a 5 per cent reduction of energy 
consumption at utility level. Since then Ghana has continued on this path of using the wide 
variety of measures and incentives described above. Easy-to-remember, catchy radio jingles 
with clear messages (e.g. reminding people to switch off appliances when leaving the house) 
that are played repeatedly are behavioural levers (salience and framing). 
Today off-grid lighting systems in Ghana are mainly aimed at poor rural communities – for 
instance on islands or at lakeside locations where grid connection remains unlikely for the 
foreseeable future. In the run-up to its current programme on rural energy development, the 
World Bank commissioned both a quantitative (1,000 households) and qualitative market 
study (55 interviews) on solar-powered lighting products for rural Ghanaian households. 
The studies found that, on average, consumers deem a price of USD 9.80 for a solar lantern 
and USD 6.50 for a solar task light (e.g. desk lamp) as neither too cheap nor too expensive. 
Average household income was USD 115, with four people living in a household. Fifty-one 
per cent of people in the sample fell in the poorest category and 30 per cent were in the next 
group up. Respondent households most often used paraffin lamps with a glass cover for 
lighting. It cost USD 3.20 to run the lamp monthly and USD 0.58 to initially buy the lamp. 
The majority also used candles (USD 1.44 per month, with each candle costing USD 0.19) 
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or battery-operated torches (USD 2.30 for batteries per month) as backup. For 32 per cent of 
consumers, a solar-powered lantern would be their preferred source of off-grid lighting, 
followed by a paraffin lamp with a glass cover (26 per cent). However, in the qualitative 
study – which let households try out two different types of solar-powered lights for three 
nights – people were willing to pay a maximum of USD 24–27 (equals to the purchase and 
running of their usual devices for four to five months) for the most popular type of lamp. On 
average, the households surveyed were prepared to spend USD 10–20 on the second most 
popular light, which would mainly serve as a reading light for school children (World Bank 
/ IFC 2008; 2009). 
The users liked the products because they were attractive and modern and thus increased 
their social status in the neighbourhood. Other positives were that they were durable, solar 
powered (having only an initial cost was actually rated as an advantage) and provided light 
coverage of a large area in the sort of bright light preferred. Many of the interviewed parents 
said they reserved one of their light sources exclusively for their children’s study. Here, the 
desk-type solar lamp was particularly useful. Some households said that a solar lamp that 
provided an electricity socket for charging a mobile or running a television would be 
extremely helpful. Barriers to actual purchase are the lack of a light stand, high costs and 
uncertainty about the safety and protection of the panel from water, accidents and other 
elements during recharging. Some households indicated a willingness to purchase if some 
sort of financing scheme were provided to them, while a few indicated a will to buy even 
without a subsidy or loan (World Bank / IFC 2208; 2009). 
This Ghanaian example indicates that taken together, status and local social norms can be a 
powerful factor that affects the perception of affordability and, in turn, the willingness to 
pay. Unfortunately, the study does not make clear whether lights were actually on sale after 
the end of the initiative. The social and attractive character of the study worked well in 
combination with the possibility to try out the equipment at home. The latter might have 
induced a positive endowment effect (i.e. it was hard for some of the households to let go of 
the solar lamps). Lighting Africa proposes several financing mechanisms to overcome initial 
end-user costs: microcredits by microfinance institutions if lending is connected to other 
larger loans (otherwise the transaction costs of lending are too high for the microfinance 
institutions); engagement of the informal financing sector; mobile phone–based lending and 
pay-as-you-go systems; and payroll loans
4
 for those employed at larger firms able to take 
over the initial purchase of the product (Lighting Africa 2012). Pay-as-you-go or fee-for-
service systems have been shown to be viable in Senegal (Diouf / Pode 2013) and India 
(Chaurey / Kandpal 2009), but none of these proposals have been sufficiently empirically 
tested yet. Finally, clear explanations of payback periods and possible additional repair costs 
after 3–5 years in comparison to the costs of current conventional lighting may help to 
inform consumer decisions. 
In sum, the analysis of lighting programmes in the three countries indicates that social 
aspects such as trust, status and social norms; framing; the status quo bias; risk aversion; and 
                                                          
4 “Once an employee makes a purchasing decision, he or she first receives a non-cash loan from the 
financial institution. The financial institution then directly pays the PLS vendor, who delivers the PLS 
to the employee. Finally, the employee authorizes the FI to deduct loan re-payments directly from his 
or her payroll” (Lighting Africa 2012, 65). 
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uncertainty are likely to play a role in the diffusion of energy efficient lighting products 
among the poor. More efficient use of mental accounting and loss aversion in framing 
awareness campaigns and advertising could be helpful as could utilizing the endowment 
effect in a positive way (e.g. by letting people try out equipment for a set period of time). 
However, careful research analysing the existence, mutual effects and potential outcomes in 
specific local settings is required before political actors or donors can make use of these 
insights. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
From the theoretical debates in sections 2 and 3 and the initial comparison of energy 
efficient lighting in Ghana, Uganda and Rwanda, different hypotheses can be deduced. I 
argue that it is useful to distinguish between types of affordability that correlate differently 
with behavioural factors. 
First, there is a ‘do-no-harm’ line (a kind of raw affordability) that should not be crossed 
when designing interventions and that is also ideally not crossed by the poor themselves. 
This line does not mean that the poor are unable to buy these products – they can, after all, 
use credit. But their purchase would actually be harmful to poverty reduction if, for 
instance, the debt could not be paid. This differs locally and could be higher or lower than 
the often proposed threshold of 10 per cent of income. For example, a household that buys 
an energy efficient CFL may thus be unable to afford new seeds the following week, but 
will be able to do so three or four weeks later. The CFL is affordable but not easily 
affordable. The ‘do-no-harm line’ is crossed if the household cannot afford to buy any 
seeds at all in the near future and misses planting time because of purchasing a CFL. 
Second, there are two types of perceived affordability that can be more strongly influenced 
by behavioural insights and that are also more strongly influenced by the preferences and 
the behaviour of the poor themselves. I argue that perceived financial affordability and 
perceived social affordability exist – neither of which harm poverty reduction. Perceived 
financial affordability is tied to hyperbolic discounting, mental accounts and to some 
extent the endowment effect as a form of economic perception. High upfront costs are 
often cited reasons for not investing in energy efficient products. With adequately 
subsidized prices or financing models (e.g. saving/credit, payment by instalment or pay-
as-you-go/leasing systems), the poor will not fall further into poverty, but rather will 
benefit from poverty reduction through energy savings over time – savings that could be 
used to buy seeds, for example. Perceived social affordability relates to social preferences 
and aspects such as trust, status and local norms. The Ghanaian households surveyed 
preferred the solar lights for reasons of status and light quality but still claimed they were 
not really affordable. But if one or more of their neighbours were to actually own a solar 
light, this perception might change. Both types of affordability may be influenced by 
framing and salience. 
Based on these arguments, the following general hypothesis (H4) is proposed:  
Energy efficiency, behavioural levers and nudges (trust, status, social events, salience, 
feedback, framing, endowment effect through trying equipment) are more likely to be 
effective if perceived affordability is high among the poor target group. The likelihood of 
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success further increases if the regulatory environment that assures quality and 
availability of efficient products (standards, labels) is developed and enforced in parallel. 
Concerning perceived financial affordability and its relation to behavioural insights, I put 
forward the following hypothesis (H5), which relates perceived financial affordability to 
the likelihood of actual investment: 
The perceived financial affordability of energy efficient products depends on a poor 
individual’s mental accounts, hyperbolic discounting and/or uncertainty about investment 
payback periods. The closer payment schemes are to a person’s mental accounts and the 
more clearly explained payback periods are, the higher a poor household’s perception of 
financial affordability becomes. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of actual purchase. 
Finally, the relationship between cost and benefit, trust and uncertainty about new 
products – which is captured by perceived social affordability – leads to the following 
hypothesis (H6): 
The higher the social acceptance of an efficient product or service in the community, the 
higher its perceived social affordability in a poor household becomes. In turn, this 
increases the likelihood of purchase/behaviour change. Poor households are more likely 
to purchase efficient products and engage in energy saving if (a) neighbours or friends 
already use the product and/or the vendor is known to them, (b) if status increase and 
payback periods are explained clearly by the vendor, and (c) if people are allowed to try 
the equipment at home and their suggestions on improvements are taken into account by 
the donors/vendors. 
For energy efficient lighting, this implies that lighting companies are likely to be more 
successful in increasing their market share and creating demand if they run a trust-building 
programme with local sales personnel (who are also trained as repair personnel for solar 
and pico-hydro products). 
These hypotheses need to be empirically tested and further adapted to local contexts in 
subsequent studies. 
The discussion of energy efficient lighting in Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda has shown that 
regulatory mechanisms, political enforcement and domestic market development could be 
improved by incorporating demand side management, which draws on behavioural 
insights. In the long run, the creation of donor-independent domestic markets for clean, 
energy efficient lighting products is required. Pro-poor energy efficiency policy in this 
regard means taking the raw and perceived affordability of energy efficient technologies 
and services into account, while using opportunities to support the domestic labour market 
whenever possible. 
 
 
 
Babette Never 
26 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
5 Outlook 
This paper reviewed the current state of behavioural economics and its applications to the 
field of energy efficiency in developing countries. It discussed the implications of this 
literature for pro-poor energy efficiency policy, taking energy efficient lighting in Ghana, 
Uganda and Rwanda as empirical examples. 
Social aspects such as trust in the utility provider or vendor of a product, status and local 
norms, as well as clearly framed and salient messages, are likely to have an impact on the 
diffusion of energy efficiency – though more research is needed here. Innovative financing 
solutions (e.g. pay-as-you-go systems and prepaid electricity metering) that more closely 
correspond to poor people’s mental accounts may also matter. 
Using qualitative methods, this paper develops hypotheses on different types of 
affordability. A ‘do-no-harm’ threshold of poverty reduction exists, below which poor 
people can afford and actually may purchase goods; it is, however, harmful to other 
dimensions of their poverty status. Above this line, a perceived affordability exists that is 
easier to influence in a pro-poor manner with behavioural levers. Perceived affordability is 
strongly influenced by the preferences of the poor themselves and less so by external socio-
economic barriers. Perceived affordability differentiates into perceived financial 
affordability and perceived social affordability. This paper hypothesized that the integration 
of behavioural factors in energy efficiency policy will be more effective if the share of 
perceived affordability grows among the poor. Offering payment schemes and providing 
information that approximate the mental accounts of the poor, while countering potential 
hyperbolic discounting, increases the chances that energy efficient products will be bought. 
The social acceptance of an energy efficient product or service in a community increases the 
perceived social affordability. Thus targeting existing local social preferences increases the 
likelihood that poor households will take energy efficient investment decisions or orient 
their behaviour towards being more energy efficient. However, future research needs to 
further refine and empirically test these hypotheses. Additionally, empirical work needs to 
be carried out on a wider variety of behavioural insights and pro-poor energy efficiency, 
including the positive and negative consequences of the rebound effect. This paper provides 
a first step in the direction of behavioural energy efficiency measures in developing 
countries and has thus set a new agenda for both research and practice. 
For political actors, using behavioural insights to scale up energy programmes is useful if it 
is part of a policy package that targets existing market, technical, financial and institutional 
barriers. Behavioural economics does not represent the silver bullet for low-carbon energy 
efficient development; it is merely one piece of the puzzle. For energy efficient lighting, for 
instance, the introduction of minimum energy performance standards and labels for light 
bulbs, quality controls, tax exemptions and adequate price subsidies could be complemented 
by behavioural insights. The combination of measures and particularly the role of 
behavioural factors need to be pre-tested, surveyed and adapted to the respective local 
context in a country. This is imperative to avoid two dangers of nudging. The first danger is 
that pushing consumers or target groups too hard towards the ‘good choice’ or inadvertently 
pushing in the wrong direction can result in subsequent undesired choices. Some people 
who have been subjected to nudging actually perform worse in repeated choices. The second 
danger is that influencing the choice architecture of the poor to some extent impacts 
democratic freedom of choice. To avoid backfiring, open debates with political actors and 
stakeholders in the respective country are required before any set of measures based on 
behavioural insights can be introduced.  
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Annex 1: Advertisement for a CFL bulb in Rwanda 
 
Source: Ashok Sarkar, World Bank, September 2013, Presentation, http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/ 
wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Session%201_5%20-%20Sustainable%20transition %20to 
%20EE% 20Lighting.pdf (accessed 13 December 2013). 
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Annex 2: Poster advertising the Uganda CFL programme 
 
Source: UNEP 2012 
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